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Abstract
We explore the key mechanisms whereby uncertainty impacts the business cycle by
exploring the interaction of uncertainty with growth in industries with di¤erent tech-
nologies of production. We nd that uncertainty shocks are particularly detrimental
to growth in industries with rapid capital depreciation or high investment adjustment
costs. The ndings are consistent with real options theory: uncertainty leads rms to
delay investment in new projects, but high depreciation and xed costs of investment
make delay more costly. On the other hand, we do not nd evidence of a signicant
role of nancial markets in the generation nor propagation of uncertainty shocks.
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Veritas visu et mora, falsa festinatione et incertis valescunt.
"Truth is conrmed by inspection and delay; falsehood by haste and uncer-
tainty."
Tacitus, Annales Liber Ii 39.
1 Introduction
Recent evidence identies second-moment shocks often simply called "uncertainty" as
a key determinant of the business cycle. However, the key sources and propagation mecha-
nisms of uncertainty remain a topic of debate. Resolving this debate is key for identifying
the empirically relevant class of model for understanding the macroeconomic impact of un-
certainty.
This paper explores the key sources and propagation mechanisms that lead uncertainty
to a¤ect the business cycle. We do so by exploring which technological characteristics lead
industries to grow asymmetrically in times of higher uncertainty. Our aim is to explore
the link between industry growth and aggregate uncertainty in a systematic way so as to
identify the empirically relevant class of theory for modeling the macroeconomic impact of
uncertainty.
The motivation behind our exercise is as follows. The technology of production varies
across industries based on factors such as the intensity with which di¤erent inputs are used,
the properties of those inputs, and so on. If a given technological characteristic interacts
systematically with the factors that lead to changes in uncertainty, or if it is one that becomes
harder to adjust in times of uncertainty, then growth in industries with that technological
characteristic will be more sensitive to changes in measured uncertainty. This indicates that
the characteristic in question tells us about the key sources or mechanisms linking uncertainty
with growth. On the other hand, if this is not a factor that interacts with uncertainty, or
if this is an easily adjusted factor in the production function, no such sensitivity will be
detected, indicating this characteristic is not empirically important for uncertainty. As a
result, any measurable interaction between an industry technological characteristic and a
measure of uncertainty is a diagnostic as to where to look to understand the sources or
macroeconomic impact of uncertainty.
Our exercise requires a denition of technology.Since the work of Kydland and Prescott
(1982), theoretical business cycle analysis is commonly performed within the context of mod-
els of economic growth. We follow the conventions of growth theory by dening technology
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in terms of the production function. We identify industry di¤erences in the production tech-
nology using factor intensities, or using the qualitative attributes of factors of production,
an approach that dates back to at least the seminal work of Cobb and Douglas (1928). For
example, di¤erences between the technology for producing Food Products (ISIC 311) and
the technology for producing Transport Equipment (ISIC 381) can be described in terms of
the former being less R&D intensive and less labor-intensive than the latter. Our technology
indicators include measures of labor intensity, human capital intensity, R&D intensity, inter-
mediate intensity, asset xity, capital depreciation, the industry rate of investment-specic
technical progress, and the specicity of the inputs used in each industry. We measure
them using US data, employing the assumption in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ilyina and
Samaniego (2011) and others that observed technological choices in the United States are
indicative of how rms would organize their production in a relatively undistorted and un-
constrained environment an assumption we discuss in detail.
We nd robust evidence of an interaction between bond market uncertainty and the rate
of capital depreciation as well as the lumpiness of investment specic to each industry. We
do not nd robust evidence of any other interactions. The fact that uncertainty interacts
with these two industry variables is consistent with the real options literature, e.g. Bernanke
(1983), or Dixit and Pindyck (1994). When growth opportunities are uncertain and irre-
versible, there is an option value to waiting for better information before adopting a growth
opportunity. If the depreciation rate of capital invested in current opportunities is high, this
will make waiting for information about growth opportunities more costly, leading rms to
invest earlier before information about whether projects are worth pursuing is revealed. Sim-
ilarly, Cooper et al (1999) and others view the lumpiness of investment as evidence of xed
investment costs, which would also make delay costly because depreciating capital might not
be replaced because of the xed cost.
Furthermore, this interaction occurs when we measure uncertainty using bond market
volatility. This measure captures uncertainty concerning safe assets, i.e. economy-wide
uncertainty, indicating the undiversiable or unhedgable portion of uncertainty. We refer to
this as systemic uncertainty. Our nding suggests that systemic uncertainty has a negative
impact on economic growth because xed costs of investment and investment irreversibilities
optimally require rms to wait for uncertainty to be resolved, but in addition where waiting
is costly rms may be pressed into hasty investment or disinvestment.
In addition, we explore whether our industry-based strategy nds evidence of any impor-
tant role for nancial markets in either the origination or propagation of uncertainty shocks,
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a key question in the literature.1 We do so in two ways: by including a measure of external
nance dependence (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) in our list of technological variables, and
by conditioning on an interaction of technology with nancial crisis indicators (Laeven and
Valencia (2013)). We do not nd any signicant interaction between external nance depen-
dence and uncertainty.2 In addition, the technology-crisis interactions are not signicant, nor
do they a¤ect our ndings concerning the link between technology and uncertainty. Thus,
our results do not support a key role for nancial markets in the macroeconomic impact
of uncertainty shocks. This is not to say that uncertainty does not cause nancial market
turmoil, nor that nancial markets are never the source of uncertainty shocks: still, in a
comprehensive data set covering several decades and countries, we do not nd evidence that
there are essential or common features of how uncertainty shocks a¤ect the macroeconomy.
Our research exercise is comprehensive. First, we use as many countries and years of data
as possible. Second, we use a large set of technological measures, drawn from the related
literature on the link between industry growth and macroeconomic outcomes.3 Third, we use
three di¤erent measures of industry growth, as well as various other measures of industry
performance to narrow down the channels whereby uncertainty a¤ects industry growth.
Fourth, we use four di¤erent measures of uncertainty, drawn from Baker and Bloom (2013).
As a result our conclusions have broad relevance. A limitation is that we use manufacturing
industry growth data. This is partly because of the di¢ culty of identifying large cross-country
data sets with service sector data, but also because manufacturing data are readily available
for purposes of extension or replication, and can be easily aggregated to draw implications
for aggregate growth. Naturally a study using a broader set of industries would be a useful
extension.4
Section 2 explains the motivation behind the exercise and outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 delivers the empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes.
1See for example Arellano et al (2012) or Gilchrist et al (2014).
2We also look at R&D intensity, which Ilyina and Samaniego (2011, 2012) link to external nance depen-
dence.
3See Rajan and Zingales (1998), Braun and Larrain (2005), Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) and Samaniego
and Sun (2015).
4It is worth noting, however, that some authors argue that one should exercise caution when performing
industry growth regressions by pooling data from di¤erent sectors or at di¤erent levels of aggregation. This
is becase the link between industry growth and its technological determinants (such as productivity growth)
varies depending on the elasticity of substitution between goods - see Samaniego and Sun (2016). Within
manufacturing, the elasticity of substitution is thought to be more than one see Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2004) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2012). Across broad sectors, however, it is generally thought that the
elasticity of substitution is less than one see Herrendorf et al. (2013). Thus, mixing goods from di¤erent
sectors or at di¤erent levels of aggregation may not be appropriate for an industry growth study.
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2 Motivation and Methodology
There are two reasons why particular industries might be more sensitive to uncertainty. One
is because the shocks that drive uncertainty particularly a¤ect them. The other is because
there are propagation or amplication mechanisms for these shocks that particularly a¤ect
certain industries.
2.1 Sources of uncertainty
Theories regarding the sources of uncertainty can broadly be classied as real, nominal
or nancial. If the source of uncertainty is real, then we might expect industries to be
sensitive to uncertainty to the extent that their technology of production is tied to the
underlying technological source of real uncertainty. For example, suppose that uncertainty is
driven by real variables, such as changes in the variance or dispersion of Hicks-neutral (labor
augmenting) productivity shocks, as in the theory of Bloom et al (2012). In this case we might
expect labor-intensive industries to be particularly susceptible to changes in uncertainty. If
uncertainty concerns the pace of investment-specic technical change (ISTC, see Ma and
Samaniego 2016), we would expect this to show up in high-ISTC industries. Alternatively,
since Greenwood et al (1988) show that capacity utilization is a key determinant of the
propagation of ISTC shocks, ISTC uncertainty might particularly a¤ect industries where
capital adjustment costs are high, as utilization rather than investment will be a key channel
of adjustment to shocks in such industries. If the unpredictable pace of fundamental technical
progress is the source of uncertainty, we would expect R&D-intensive or human-capital
intensive industries to be more sensitive to uncertainty. On the other hand, if nominal
uncertainty is key the volatility or dispersion of prices, as suggested by Oi (1961) then
we would expect to observe a strong reaction of prices during periods of uncertainty, and a
particularly strong reaction in industries that user intermediate goods intensively. Finally,
if the source of uncertainty is nancial, then we would expect industries where the need for
external funds is particularly high to be sensitive to uncertainty shocks.
2.2 Mechanisms of uncertainty
Perhaps uncertainty has many sources in di¤erent places and at di¤erent points in time. Still,
regardless of the origin of uncertainty, there may be key propagation mechanisms that lead
uncertainty to have a macroeconomic impact. Depending on the mechanism, this may imply
an asymmetric impact of uncertainty on industry growth. For example, real options theory
5
suggests that industries where investment is subject to xed costs of adjustment might grow
slowly when uncertainty is high because they prefer to defer investment until uncertainty is
resolved.
More broadly, the survey of Bloom (2014) describes four theories behind the macro-
economic impact of uncertainty, each of which might interact with di¤erent aspects of the
production technology:
1. Real options: when starting or ceasing new business projects is subject to xed costs or
to irreversibilities, greater uncertainty induces caution among rms. This could lead to
declines in production for several reasons. One is that potential growth projects may be
delayed pending the resolution of uncertainty. Another is that industries where waiting
is more costly (e.g. because maintaining current projects is costly due to high capital
depreciation) may su¤er more, since they may be forced to act before the uncertainty
has been resolved. In addition, increased caution in the face of uncertainty may lead
rms that should contract or expand based on their changing productivity to wait,
slowing reallocation of resources among heterogeneous rms and lowering aggregate
productivity. See Bernanke (1983) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) among others. In
this case we would expect to observe these industries also displaying low productivity.
2. Risk aversion: when rms are risk averse, greater uncertainty (including a greater risk
of default) may lower economic activity by increasing the cost of external funds. See
for example Gilchrist et al (2014). In this case we would expect uncertainty to have
a negative impact on growth, but particularly in industries with high external nance
dependence.
3. Growth options: on the other hand, when reversion to an old project is easy, greater
uncertainty increases the value of trying a new project, without increasing the downside
risk (since this can be avoided by simply reverting), leading rms to act as though they
were risk-loving. Kraft et al (2013) nd evidence of this e¤ect in asset prices of R&D
intensive rms. In this case, we would expect industries where growth opportunities
are greater to grow particularly fast when uncertainty is high be it labor-intensive,
high-ISTC, high-human capital or high-R&D industries, depending on the ultimate
sources of growth and of uncertainty.
4. Oi-Hartman-Abel e¤ects: Some authors have argued that uncertainty can increase
growth because, by expanding when outcomes are good or contracting when outcomes
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are bad, again rms may behave as though they are risk-loving rather than risk averse
in the face of uncertainty. See Oi (1961), Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983). These
e¤ects are distinct from growth options because they do not involve switching between
new and old projects, rather they involve changes in the scale of production of current
projects. This is more likely to be observed in industries where adapting to changing
conditions is simple, so we would expect to observe relatively slow growth (compared
to the average) where exibility is low e.g. where capital depreciates rapidly or where
assets such as capital or knowledge are rm-specic. This is similar to the industries
that would su¤er in a world where real options are important.
The rst two theories, which hinge on some inexibility at the rm level to adjust to
uncertainty, imply that uncertainty leads to contractions in business activity. Thus, we re-
fer to real options and risk aversion as contractionary theories of uncertainty. On the other
hand, the last two theories hinge on the exibility of rms to adapt to uncertainty, and imply
the that uncertainty leads to expansion. We refer to growth options and Oi-Hartman-Abel
e¤ects as expansionary theories of uncertainty. Of course, given that uncertainty shocks and
rst moment shocks may often coincide, it is di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ect of uncertainty using
aggregate data: this is what motivates our study using industry data instead. Furthermore,
each theory has implications for which kind of industry we would expect to see expanding
or contracting more in times of uncertainty. For example, if real options theory is important
for understanding the uncertainty-business cycle link, we would expect industries where ad-
justment costs of investment are relatively large to display greater sensitivity to uncertainty.
If risk aversion is an important channel for uncertainty to a¤ect growth, we should observe
a decline in growth particularly in industries that have greater need or more limited ability
to raise external funds.
To summarize, we classify theories of uncertainty according to
1. whether the source of uncertainty is real, nominal or nancial;
2. whether the propagation mechanism for uncertainty is contractionary or expansionary,
each of which comes in 2 varieties.
Thus, we have a matrix of 12 potential classes of theory of the macroeconomic impact
of uncertainty. The objective of this paper is precisely to use di¤erences in growth across
industries with di¤erent technological characteristics as a way to identify which of this twelve
classes of theories are empirically more relevant for understanding how uncertainty a¤ects
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macroeconomic dynamics. In what follows we outline an empirical strategy for detecting the
disproportionate impact of uncertainty on industry growth based on technological factors.
We propose to distinguish between these theories by studying the relationship between
uncertainty and industry growth. The logic is as follows. An extensive literature docu-
ments systematic di¤erence in the technology of production across industries. Each theory
of uncertainty has implications for which kind of industry based on their technology of
production should interact most with uncertainty, and whether this interaction is positive
or negative. Ordering industries according to a particular technological characteristic, we
should be able to determine whether industry growth in industries with that characteristic
disproportionately interacts with uncertainty or not, thus telling us which theories are or
are not empirically relevant for understanding the impact of uncertainty on growth. If a
given characteristic does not interact with uncertainty, then theories that emphasize that
characteristic are not empirically relevant either because that theory is not quantitatively
important compared to others, or because the characteristic is easily adjustable so that the
mechanism in that theory does not impose binding constraints on rms.
Ideally to implement this strategy, we should use a large set of technological character-
istics, as well as several measures of industry performance. We also need to condition on
general factors that a¤ect industry growth, other than the technology-uncertainty interac-
tions of interest. Since we seek to identify di¤erential behavior of growth across industries,
that means we need to condition on the overall growth impact of rst- and second-moment
shocks as well. As a practical matter, as well as for our ndings to have global generality,
we also wish to use as large a sample as possible by pooling data from many countries, since
signicant uncertainty shocks are likely not very common in any given economy. In what
follows we detail our strategy for implementing this procedure.
This is not to say that the only way to identify technology-uncertainty interactions is
to use industry data. An alternative strategy for using disaggregated rather than aggregate
data would be to use a large rm level dataset to perform a similar exercise. We do not
do so for several reasons. One is coverage: whereas some related work on uncertainty does
look at rm level data, these are generally for publicly traded rms only, which for many
countries may be only a small share of business activity and which could be subject to
selection bias because the decision of whether or not to trade publicly is presumably one
which could be a¤ected by uncertainty. Furthermore, the set of rms in any data set is
endogenous in the sense that country- or date-specic factors (including uncertainty) may
skew the composition of a rm-level dataset so that, if technological characteristic X hurts
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rms for some reason in uncertain times, X-intensive rms may simply shut down and exit
the dataset. With industries this will not be a problem, however, since if characteristic X is
important and di¢ cult to adjust then X-intensive industries will grow slowly and the exit
of X-intensive rms would be detected as slower industry growth. This is also a reason why,
when measuring technological characteristics at the industry level, we will want to nd an
industry index that does not vary across countries or dates. To the extent that there is
some heterogeneity in the technology of production, industries with a technological feature
that su¤er during periods of uncertainty may display that feature less in uncertain times
because (as mentioned) rms who have that feature the most may exit the dataset. Instead,
we would require a measure of technology that a¤ects all rms, and which is held constant
across rms and indeed across countries. Again, if a technological characteristic is easily
adjusted or is not relevant for uncertainty then it will simply not be identied as being
empirically important by our procedure. That said, an appropriate study using rm level
data set would make an interesting complement to our research.
2.3 Econometric specication
Our objective is to see which technological characteristics lead industries to be more sensitive
to uncertainty shocks. To do so, we estimate the following equation:
Growthc;i;t = i;c + i;t + c;t + 1(LevelShockc;t Xi)
+ 2(UncertaintyShockc;t Xi) + 3Controlsi;c;t + c;i;t (1)
In equation (1), Growthc;i;t is a measure of growth in industry i in country c at date t.
The dummy variables i;c + i;t + c;t capture all date- or country-specic factors that might
a¤ect growth in industry i, or factors a¤ecting growth in country c at a particular date. All
that remains are factors that specically a¤ect growth in industry i in country c at date t.
Xi is a technological factor of interest that characterizes the production function of in-
dustry i, and which is hypothesized to interact with uncertainty. It appears in equation
(1) interacted with UncertaintyShockc;t, which is a second-moment shock, an indicator of
uncertainty. Thus the coe¢ cient 2 is the di¤erential impact of industry characteristic Xi on
industry growth when uncertainty is high. We identify the underlying technological determi-
nants of di¢ culty in uncertain periods by seeing which technological characteristics display
a signicant interaction coe¢ cient 2.
Since 2 captures the di¤erence in industry growth in uncertain times relative to normal
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times for industries with di¤erent levels of Xi, 2 < 0 indicates that growth in industries
with high Xi is more seriously a¤ected by uncertainty. For example, if Xi measures the
depreciation rate of capital, then 1 < 0 would indicate that industries that use rapidly
depreciating capital grow particularly slowly when there is uncertainty. Conversely 1 > 0
would indicate that such industries grow particularly fast when there is uncertainty.
The variable LevelShockc;t is a country- and year-specic measure of the level of economic
activity. We interact it with the technological variable Xi also because, as is well known in
the literature, increases in uncertainty may coincide with (or even cause) downturns in
economic activity. Thus we wish to condition on rst moment measures of the level of
economic activity. The overall level is already captured by the dummy c;t, so the coe¢ cient
1 captures any residual industry-specic impact that level shocks (including the impact
of uncertainty shocks on levels of overall economic activity) on industry growth based on
technological measure Xi.
This argument raises the possibility of endogeneity of growth and uncertainty: the level
and uncertainty shocks may be correlated and also endogenous. One way we handle this is
precisely by looking at industry growth rather than aggregate growth. Any omitted variables
that cause both growth and uncertainty (as well as level shocks) should be picked up by the
c;t indicators, including the level e¤ects. This was precisely the original motivation in
Rajan and Zingales (1998) for adopting a di¤erences-in-di¤erences specication such as that
in specication (1). In addition, we condition on possible interactions of level e¤ects and
the technological variables. We also deal with the possibility of any residual endogeneity in
industry growth by using instrumental variables, as suggested in Baker and Bloom (2013) in
the context of aggregate growth.5 In this case both level and uncertainty shocks would need
to be instrumented. Given a set of instruments for the level and moment shocks Instr (c; t),
the instruments to be used when the dependent variable is an interaction with the level and
moment shocks as in specication (1) are Instr(c; t)X(i), see Wooldridge (2002).
Some comments on our estimation strategy are in order. First, we seek industry techno-
logical indicators Xi that are representative of the technology of production across countries.
Suppose for example that Xi represents labor intensity. It is important to underline that
we do not seek to measure the observed labor intensity at rms in industry i around the
world, or in each country or at each date. For example, observed labor intensity is not a
technological variable, as it will be a¤ected by current economic conditions such as the state
of uncertainty or the state of the business cycle at date t in country c; or by nancing or other
5The instruments are exogenous "disasters", as described in detail below.
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institutional frictions that could distort rm behavior in country c. We seek a benchmark
measure of labor intensity that rms in industry i would adopt in a relatively undistorted
environment which, when distorted by economic conditions in country c and/or at date t,
might lead to particular di¢ culty to rms in industry i.6 Following the related literature,
we will measure the technological variables Xi using US data and where possible using data
on publicly traded rms in the US, whose technological choices are unlikely to be distorted
by nancing di¢ culties or by other frictions. We return to this issue when we dene our
technological measures Xi.
Second, since the number of group-specic e¤ects in this estimation equation is very
large,7 the computational cost of estimating (1) is signicant. Instead, we proceed by
subtracting from all dependent and independent variables the mean value for each (c; t),
(i; t) and (c; i) pair so that the individual specic e¤ects i;c; i;t and c;t are removed
from the estimation equation. We call these variables \Growthc;i;t, \(LevelShockc;t Xi),
\(UncertaintyShockc;t Xi) and \Controlsc;i;t. Then, we estimate (1), using the de-meaned
variables, and without i;c + i;t + c;t among the regressors. This yields the following speci-
cation:
\Growthc;i;t = 1 \(LevelShockc;t Xi)+2 \(UncertaintyShockc;t Xi)+3 \Controlsi;c;t+c;i;t
(2)
The exact error structure for this procedure is not known so we use a variety of approaches
to estimating this modied equation (2), nding that the results are robust. These meth-
ods include bootstrapping, allowing for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White method,
clustering by industry, and allowing for autocorrelated errors.8 The results reported use
bootstrapped errors.
Finally, recall that we also require the estimation of (1) using instrumental variables.
We use the well known 2SLS approach to instrumental variables estimation. This involves
regressing the endogenous dependent variables on the others, including dummies and instru-
ments. We must thus modify the demeaned specication (2) so as to implement the 2SLS
6Of course, any impact of country-specic conditions on industry i or of country-specic conditions at
date t would be absorbed by the c;i and c;t indicators respectively.
7Since there are about 60 countries, 28 industries and 42 years, we would have over 50,000 xed e¤ects
in a balanced panel.
8Bertrand et al (2004) argue that di¤erences-in-di¤erences specications may su¤er from problems with
autocorrelated errors. However this relates to specications where there is a persistent treatment vs. non-
treatment variable. In our contect there is no such problem because of the constellation of country-time
and industry-time dummies. When we estimate the specication allowing for autocorrelated errors the
autocorrelation coe¢ cient is small, around 0:01.
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procedure. Since the 2SLS procedure requires that the large number of dummy variables
should be included at both stages, we implement the demeaning procedure at both stages in
order to deal with them.
3 Data
3.1 Dening Uncertainty
We measure uncertainty using the observed volatility of indicators of economic activity or of
economically useful information, e.g. Baker and Bloom (2013). Such measures either dene
uncertainty as the volatility of these measures, or implicitly dene uncertainty as the inability
to forecast economically important series. For example, if intra-year stock market volatility
is the measure of uncertainty, it also admits an interpretation in terms of unforecastability of
economically important developments since, according to standard theories of asset pricing,
the volatility of stock prices indicates volatile information.
Jurado et al (2015) interpret uncertainty strictly as unforecastability and try to measure
uncertainty in terms of the component of macroeconomically important measures that is
unforecastable based on a wide array of time series. We do not adopt this approach to
measuring uncertainty as such an approach requires a large set of time series to identify
unforecastable events, which would be challenging to perform in a consistent manner for
many countries. In any case, we nd that the Jurado et al (2015) measure of uncertainty is
highly statistically signicantly correlated to the four uncertainty measures we use for the
US.9
We adopt four measures of uncertainty and economic activity, drawing from Baker and
Bloom (2013).10 In each case, there is a measure of uncertainty based on second moment
shocks, and a corresponding measure of rst moment shocks.
1. Stock Market Data: The rst moment shock is the annual cumulative stock market
return, using the broadest general stock market index available for each country, from
the Global Financial Database. Uncertainty over the year is the average quarterly
standard deviation of daily stock daily returns.
9The annual macroeconomic uncertainty series of Jurado et al (2015) at a quarterly frequency has a
correlation with the four series Baker and Bloom (2013) we use below computed at similar frequency of
between 0:27 and 0:56, statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in all cases.
10Baker and Bloom (2013) also use a measure of uncertainty based on forecaster disagreement: however
we do not have these data for enough countries to make our panel strategy useful.
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2. Cross Sectional Firm Data: The rst moment shock is the average rm-level stock
return, from the WRDS international equity database. Uncertainty is the average
quarterly standard deviation of returns.
3. Bond Yield Data: The rst moment shock is the average daily 10-year Government
bond yield. Uncertainty is the average quarterly volatility of daily percentage changes
in bond yields.
4. Exchange Rate Data: The rst moment shock is the average daily exchange rate from
the Global Financial Database. Uncertainty is the average quarterly volatility of daily
percentage exchange rate changes.
Rather than viewing them as di¤erent measures of uncertainty (i.e. di¤erent approaches
to capturing the same thing), we view them as capturing di¤erent kinds of uncertainty.
For example, equity contracts are generally thought of as being subject to greater potential
asymmetric information problems than debt (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and more re-
cently Hérbert (2016)), and most kinds of debt are likely to be safer than equity because of
the payments being xed except in case of default. Thus, stock market volatility captures
uncertainty concerning risky investments, whereas changes in cross sectional dispersion re-
ect changes in the variation of uncertainty concerning di¤erent investments. Bond market
volatility we view as capturing uncertainty concerning safe assets, possibly indicating the
undiversiable or unhedgable portion of uncertainty, including economy-wide uncertainty
e.g. uncertainty stemming from the sovereigns policy or default decisions. We refer to this
as systemic uncertainty. Finally, exchange rate uncertainty concerns uncertainty from in-
ternational sources, or changes in the dispersion of uncertainty across countries. Of course
these types of uncertainty are not completely orthogonal e.g. volatility of concern about
sovereign default will inuence exchange rate and stock market volatility. and vice versa if
a government-funded bailout is expected.
3.2 Instrumental variables
As mentioned, there is some concern in the literature that level shocks and second moment
shocks (uncertainty) could be jointly determined. This is one of the motivations behind
our di¤erences-in-di¤erences specication with a complete constellation of (i; c), (i; t) and
(c; t) dummy variables: any endogeneity between aggregate rst and second moment shocks
is irrelevant, only e¤ects that are specic to industries in a particular country in periods of
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uncertainty such as the interaction of second moment shocks and technology will be picked
up by our industry-level interaction coe¢ cients of interest. This is also the motivation behind
this methodology, introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998), albeit in a context without a
time panel.
We also account for endogeneity by using a standard instrumental variables procedure.
We employ instruments that have been found to be useful in the related literature. Speci-
cally, Baker and Bloom (2013) use a measure of exogenous "disasters" as instruments. The
details are in their paper, including details of checks on the exogeneity of these measures,
but broadly "disasters" include:
1. Natural Disasters: Extreme weather and geological events as dened by the Center
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Industrial and transportation
disasters are not included.
2. Terrorist Attacks: high casualty terrorist bombings as dened by the Center for Sys-
temic Peace (CSP).
3. Political Shocks: An indicator for successful assassination attempts, coups, revolutions,
and wars, from the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) Integrated Network for Societal
Conict Research. There are two types of political shocks: forceful or military action
which leads to the change of executive authority within the government, and a rev-
olutionary war or violent uprising led by politically organized groups outside current
government within that country.
Each of these country-year indicator variables is interacted with the industry technological
measure of interest. This interaction variable is the relevant instrument in our context where
the independent variables are themselves interaction variables, see Wooldridge (2002) for
a theoretical explanation and Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) for an empirical example. The
econometric strategy for implementing the instrumental variables procedure using de-meaned
variables is described earlier in Section 2.
3.3 Industry outcomes
We measure Growthc;i;t in three ways. First, we use the log change in industry value added,
as reported in the INDSTAT3 and INDSTAT4 databases, distributed by UNIDO. Second,
we use the log change in gross output. Third, we use the log change in the Laspeyres produc-
tion index. Having three di¤erent growth indices gives the results considerable robustness.
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Furthermore, these three measures tell us about di¤erent aspects of industry performance.
Value added growth tells us about an industrys ability to generate income and contribute to
GDP. Gross output growth tells us about production overall, valued at market prices. The
production index tells us about production in terms of units rather than market prices.
In addition to industry growth, we investigate growth in a variety of industry indicators
to better understand the channels whereby contractions might a¤ect the performance of
industries with particular technological characteristics. These indicators are: the number
of employees, the number of establishments, gross xed capital formation, and labor pro-
ductivity. We also create an industry price index, dividing value added by the production
index, and examine the growth of this price index.11 Value added, gross output and gross
xed capital formation are deated using the CPI of the local currency (from the World
Development Indicators). Labor productivity is dened as real value added over the number
of employees.
All these variables are reported for 28manufacturing industries based on the ISIC-revision
2 classication in INDSTAT3. We use only countries for which there are at least 10 years of
observations. To avoid the inuence of outliers, the 1st and 99th percentiles of Growthc;i;t are
eliminated from the sample (the same applies to the other dependent variables considered).
We lose some countries as uncertainty data in Baker and Bloom (2013) are not available for
the whole globe. This generates a sample of 60 countries from 1970 to 2012, leading to over
40; 000 observations. The panel is unbalanced, and the sample sizes vary across countries
and industries as some of the data were not reported by national statistical agencies. Table
1 lists the country sample and the number of observations for each country. Data from 1970
to 2004 are from INDSTAT3, while later data are from the successor dataset INDSTAT4.
The United States is not included in the regressions because it is the benchmark economy
for measuring industry technological variables.
3.4 Industry Technological Measures
Theory suggests a variety of technological characteristics that could be related to the sen-
sitivity to uncertainty. Below we list the characteristics we consider and describe their
measurement. The di¤erent technological measures are calculated using U.S. data and are
assumed to represent real industry technological characteristics in a (relatively) unregulated
and nancially frictionless environment. Technological di¤erences among industries are as-
sumed to be persistent across countries, meaning that the rankings of these indices are stable
11This procedure is akin to computing the GDP deator for a particular industry.
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Table 1: Country Coverage and Number of Observations
Country
No. of
observations Country
No. of
observations
Argentina 961 Kuwait 907
Australia 999 Luxembourg 1,013
Austria 1,013 Mexico 961
Belgium 1,009 Morocco 1,039
Bangladesh 961 Netherlands 1,013
Canada 961 Nigeria 934
China 772 Norway 985
Chile 1,033 New Zealand 1,065
Colombia 1,013 Pakistan 961
Czech Republic 715 Peru 1,065
Denmark 1,013 Philippines 799
Ecuador 1,013 Poland 1,013
Egypt 961 Portugal 1,007
Finland 1,013 Romania 1,039
France 1,013 Russian Federation 499
United Kingdom 1,010 South Africa 1,036
Germany 444 Saudi Arabia 934
Greece 986 Singapore 1,025
Hungary 1,013 Spain 1,011
India 987 Sweden 1,013
Indonesia 1,013 Switzerland 961
Ireland 1,004 Thailand 961
Iran, (Islamic Republic of) 1,013 Tunisia 961
Israel 957 Turkey 961
Italy 1,011 Ukraine 445
Japan 1,013 Venezuela 961
Kenya 1,018 Viet Nam 202
Korea, Republic of 1,039
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across countries, although index values in each country do not necessarily have to be the
same.12 See Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) and Samaniego and
Sun (2015) for related discussions.
As mentioned earlier, we use the growth-theoretic denition of technology as relating
to the structure of the production function. We consider the following measures of input
intensity and input characteristics, each of which can be related to a source of uncertainty
and/or to one of the four mechanisms of uncertainty raised in the theoretical literature. In
each case we discuss reasons why the measure might be expected to interact with one or
other theory of uncertainty, to motivate their inclusion, but we tie them more closely to
particular theories of uncertainty in a later subsection:
 Labor intensity: Growth in labor intensive industries might interact more with un-
certainty if the volatility or dispersion of Harrod-neutral productivity shocks is a key
source of changes in uncertainty. Labor intensity (LABi) is measured using the ratio
of total wages and salaries over the total value added in the US, using UNIDO data.
This represents the overall importance of human capital in production in each indus-
try. In this case we would expect 2 > 0 or 2 < 0 depending on whether uncertainty
encourages or discourages growth, based on the mechanisms discussed earlier. 2 > 0
would indicate one of the two expansionary theories is relevant, whereas 2 < 0 would
indicate a contractionary theory is more relevant.
 Skilled labor : While LABi measures the overall importance of human capital for pro-
duction in industry i, it may be that the type of human capital matters too. For
example, skilled labor may entail higher adjustment costs because of the specicity of
human capital, which might lead to greater labor adjustment costs when uncertainty
is high due to the accumulation of rm- or task-specic knowledge, in which case we
would expect a coe¢ cient 2 < 0 for any measure of skill intensity. To examine this
possibility we include a human-capital indicatorHCi, measured using the average wage
bill (wages divided by number of employees). See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
 Capital depreciation: Industries that use capital with high rates of depreciation might
fare less well in uncertain times. Real options theory indicates that when investment
is irreversible or subject to xed costs, more uncertainty leads rms to optimally delay
investment, and this delay will be more costly if depreciation of the existing capital is
12The measures below are drawn from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) and Samaniego and Sun (2015), and
represent averages over the period 1970-2000. Industry measures computed using the Compustat database
are median rm values for each industry unless otherwise stated.
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rapid. Thus, industries with high depreciation will act before uncertainty is resolved,
leading to lower growth and a coe¢ cient of 2 < 0. Oi-Hartman-Abel e¤ects would
imply opposite, since they predict higher growth among industries where there is more
downward exibility, allowing rms to insure against negative shocks by contracting
(high depreciation allows rms to contract simply by not investing, as opposed to
actively disinvesting which would require paying xed costs or incurring irreversibility
costs as in Veracierto (2002) for example). Depreciation (DEPi) is the industry rate of
depreciation, computed using the BEA industry-level capital ow tables. It is based on
empirical studies of the resale value of capital goods (see Hulten and Wyko¤ (1981))
and thus reects all factors that result in the decline in the value of capital goods,
including both physical and economic depreciation.
 Investment specic technical progress: Investment specic technical change (ISTCi) is
viewed by some as an important driver of the cycle e.g. Justiniano et al (2010, 2011),
hence it could also be an important source of uncertainty if the volatility of ISTC
shocks changes over time, having a coe¢ cient 2 ? 0 depending on which theory of
propagation turns out to be empirically relevant. Also, ISTCi is a factor of economic
depreciation, so it could be related to uncertainty for the same reasons as DEPi.
Investment-specic technical change (ISTCi) is measured using the rate of decline
in the quality-adjusted price of capital goods used by each industry, relative to the
price of consumption and services, weighting the share of each type of capital using the
BEA industry-level capital ow tables. This indicates the extent to which technological
obsolescence leads to a decline in the market value of capital goods used in each industry
(see for example Greenwood et al (1997)).
 R&D intensity: R&D intensive industries could be sensitive to uncertainty for several
reasons. R&D is viewed by many as an important driver of the cycle see Ilyina and
Samaniego (2012) for a multisector R&D based growth model. Hence it could also be
an important source of uncertainty if the volatility of the outcome of R&D changes over
time, having a coe¢ cient 2 ? 0 depending on which theory of propagation turns out to
be empirically relevant. In addition, Corrado et al (2007) nd that intangible assets are
systematically less durable than tangible assets. Third, R&D investment is up-front
and has uncertain payo¤, so it may be subject to signicant irreversibilities. R&D
intensity is also related to nance dependence (Ilyina and Samaniego (2011, 2012), so
it could interact with uncertainty if nancial sources or channels are important. R&D
intensity (RNDi) is measured as R&D expenditures over total capital expenditures,
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as reported in Compustat see Ilyina and Samaniego (2011).
 Asset xity: According to Hart and Moore (1994), non-xed assets are intangible so,
as mentioned, they may depreciate more rapidly than xed assets, as well as being
less reversible. Braun and Larrain (2005) argue that asset xity is a key determinant
not of the need for external nance but of the ability to raise external funds, so an
interaction of xity with uncertainty could be indicative of nancial sources or channels
for uncertainty. Asset xity (FIXi) is the ratio of xed assets to total assets, computed
using Compustat data following Braun and Larrain (2005).
 Input specicity: The specicity of inputs makes them more costly to adjust when
conditions change, a lack of exibility which implies greater negative impact of uncer-
tainty according to many of the theoretical mechanisms discussed earlier. One measure
of input specicity is the relationship-specicity indicator (SPECi) developed in Nunn
(2007). It measures the extent to which inputs are dependent on relationship-specic
investment between the supplier and the buyer. Nunn (2007) measures, for each good,
the proportion of inputs that are not sold on an organized exchange nor reference-priced
in a trade publication. If inputs are sold on an organized exchange or reference-priced,
there must exist a large number of buyers and sellers, indicating this good is not
dependent on relationship-specic investments.13
In addition, Cooper et al (1999) and more recently Samaniego (2010) suggest that
investment lumpiness (LMPi) indicates that investment in physical capital is subject to
signicant adjustment costs, either in the form of xed costs or to irreversibilities. The
results of Lanteri (2016) also suggest that capital specicity is an e¤ective adjustment
cost. As in Ilyina and Samaniego (2011), lumpiness is dened as the average number
of investment spikes per rm during a decade in a given industry, computed using
Compustat data. A spike is dened as an annual capital expenditure exceeding 30%
of the rms stock of xed assets, as in Doms and Dunne (1998).
 Intermediate intensity: Industries that use intermediate inputs intensively may also be
particularly sensitive to volatility or dispersion in input prices. As a result, an inter-
action of industry growth with uncertainty in intermediate-intensive industries would
indicate the importance of nominal volatility as a source of uncertainty shocks. We
13Nunn (2007) reports a second measure, the proportion of inputs not being sold on an exchange. This
"moderate" measure of relationship specicity is strongly correlated with the "strict" one, but usually per-
forms worse in the regressions than the "strict" measure.
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measure intermediate intensity INTi by dividing gross output by the di¤erence be-
tween gross output and value added, as measured in the United States and as reported
in INDSTAT3 over the time period of our study.
 External nance dependence: Although it is not a strictly technological variable in
our sense (nance is not an input as such, but rather a means to acquiring inputs),
many studies such as Rajan and Zingales (1998), Braun and Larrain (2005) and Ilyina
and Samaniego (2011) nd that the industry tendency to draw on external funds is
related to growth and the business cycle. As such, any interaction of this variable with
uncertainty would indicate the importance of a nancial origin to uncertainty or of
nancial channels, as suggested in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al (2012) inter alia. We
measure external nance dependence (EFDi) as the share of capital expenditures not
nanced internally, see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Samaniego and Sun (2015) for
details.
Table 2 reports the values of these measures, and Table 3 shows the matrix of correlations
among them. Asset xity and R&D intensity are negatively correlated, as expected. Labor
intensity LABi and capital depreciation DEPi are positively correlate. Perhaps surprisingly,
ISTCi and DEPi are not correlated, since the two are related in theory. On the other
hand, DEPi and LMPi are positively correlated, which is intuitive if we interpret investment
lumpiness as evidence of investment irreversibilities or xed costs of investment, which would
lead to some capital depreciation in the event of investment or disinvestment. This fact
implies that later ndings about DEPi and LMPi interacting with uncertainty are not
necessarily distinct ndings.
Again, central to our identication strategy is the assumption that technological measures
Xi are constant across countries and across time. Regarding time variation, Ilyina and
Samaniego (2011) show that the rankings of industries according to the above measures
computed by decades persist over the period (1970-2000).14 Regarding country variation, it
is important to remember that the assumption is not that, for example, LABi accurately
measures labor intensity in manufacturing industries around the world. The assumption is
that this indicates the labor intensity of a typical rm operating in industry i in a relatively
undistorted and unconstrained environment. Remember that country- or date-specic factors
that a¤ect a given industry will be absorbed by the indicator variables in equation (1). We
are interested in how these measures interact with uncertainty. For example LABi might not
14The exception is SPECi, for which we lack time series.
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Major Variables
EFD DEP ISTC RND LAB FIX LMP SPEC HC INT
EFD 1
DEP 0.0855 1
ISTC 0.2838 -0.0433 1
RND 0.7896** 0.0868 0.4605** 1
LAB -0.0484 0.3895** -0.138 -0.1732 1
FIX -0.0895 -0.1805 -0.1689 -0.3895** -0.2217 1
LMP 0.4980** 0.3931** 0.4077** 0.6058** 0.3065 -0.7232** 1
SPEC 0.3274 0.5266** 0.2851 0.2729 0.3384 -0.141 0.4247** 1
HC 0.2391 -0.148 0.0662 0.2394 -0.6013** 0.4503** -0.2589 -0.1171 1
INT -0.2157 -0.2213 -0.3371 -0.4358** -0.1619 0.5021** -0.4354** -0.4150** 0.2667 1
Note: EFDi (external nance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specic technical change), RND (R&D
intensity), LABi (labor intensity), FIXi (xity), LMPi (investment lumpiness), HCi (human capital intensity) are the average
of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi (relationship-specic investment) is taken from Nunn (2007);
INTi (intermediate inputs intensity) is from authors calculation. ** signicance level 5%
interact with uncertainty because labor intensity is not a technological feature that interacts
with uncertainty. Also, LABi might not interact with uncertainty even if labor intensity
is a technological feature that interacts with uncertainty in theory, if it happens that labor
intensity is easily adjusted by rms to deal with uncertainty (e.g. if labor and capital are
close substitutes). In either case, deviations from our working assumption will bias our
results towards not nding signicant interactions.
An alternative of course would be to measure the technological characteristics separately
for each country. We do not do this for several reasons. The main reason why we do
not wish to use country-specic industry technology measures is that, as discussed, actual
labor use in a nancially underdeveloped or otherwise distorted economy cannot be viewed
as a technological characteristic, since actual input use likely reects distorted behavior 
see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2011, 2012). Another reason
is that the data simply do not exist  except for LABi. We computed LABc;i for each
country c and industry i following the procedure described earlier. Then for each country we
computed the cross-industry correlation between LABc;i and LABi as measured in the US
our technological measure. We found that this correlation ranged from over 92 percent for
the UK to  39 percent in Benin out of the 54 countries for which we were able to compute
LABc;i. On the one hand, this indicates some cross-country variation: on the other hand,
we found that this correlation was positive and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level
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in 49. In this sense, the US measure LABi is not a bad proxy for other countries.
3.5 Controls
In the empirical literature on industry growth it is common to condition on the share of
industry i in manufacturing in the previous period, in case there is mean reversion, structural
change, or other secular factors of industry growth. We do so as well.
Given the likely correlation between rst and second moment shocks, we condition on
interactions of the technological variables with the rst moment shocks as well. For each
measure of uncertainty, the corresponding rst moment shock is described earlier.
In addition, Samaniego and Sun (2015) nd that technological characteristics may inter-
act with contractions, so we condition on interactions of contractions and the technological
variables as well, as a non-linear control for business cycle e¤ects. Contractions are dened
using a standard peak-trough criterion as implemented by the NBER, see Samaniego and
Sun (2015) for details. Our results concerning uncertainty turn out not to be sensitive to
the presence of this control.
Finally, an open question in the literature on the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty
is whether or not uncertainty stems from the nancial sector, or is propagated by the nan-
cial sector. We assess this in three ways. First, as mentioned, we use EFDi as a potential
technological interaction variable. If there is an important nancial sector role in the macro-
economic impact of uncertainty, we would expect this variable to interact with uncertainty
shocks. Second, we do the same with R&D intensity (RNDi), which Ilyina and Samaniego
(2011, 2012) nd to be a strong correlate and possible technological determinant of EFDi.
Third, we condition on whether or not the interactions of interest are robust to an inter-
action of technology with a nancial crisis indicator. We draw on the Systemic Banking
Crises Database developed by Laeven and Valencia (2013), which covers the period 1970
to 2011. We dene the variable Crisisc;t to equal one if the Database considers country c
at date t to be experiencing a banking crisis, and zero otherwise. A year-country pair is
determined to be in crisis if there are signicant signs of nancial distress in the banking
system (bank runs, signicant bank losses or bank liquidations, and if there is signicant
policy intervention in response to losses in the banking system. Then, we use Crisisc;t Xi
as a control for each technological variable Xi, to see whether the results are driven by crises
rather than uncertainty and to see whether there are nancial channels for uncertainty.
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3.6 Hypotheses
To sum up, we re-state the di¤erent theories of uncertainty in the literature, linking them
to particular technological interactions our empirical strategy aims to identify:
3.6.1 Sources of uncertainty
 In general, if uncertainty stems from shocks that particularly a¤ect a particular type
of industry or a particular input, we would expect to see that type of industry or
industries that use that type of input intensively to react most in the face of uncertainty.
For example, uncertainty deriving from the volatility or dispersion of Harrod-neutral
productivity shocks (the source of uncertainty in the model of Bloom et al (2012)) would
be expected to a¤ect labor-intensive industries the most (LABi). Uncertainty deriving
from the process of growth through technical progress using new techniques should
impact R&D-intensive industries more than others (RNDi). If uncertainty stems from
ISTC, a high value of ISTCi would be related to greater sensitivity instead.
 If price uncertainty is important, we would expect to see intermediate-intensive rms
react the most to uncertainty (INTi). In addition, whatever industries react the most
to uncertainty, we would expect to see an impact of uncertainty on the industry price
indices we constructed. Specicity of inputs (SPECi), or input intensity (INTi),
might interact with uncertainty to the extent that uncertainty is related to volatility
of input prices or of gross output productivity, or if inputs rather than capital or labor
are subject to important adjustment costs.
 If nancial uncertainty is key, then we would expect to see a disproportionate impact
of uncertainty on industries with high external nance dependence (EFDi) or R&D
intensity (RNDi). We would also expect whatever industries are most sensitive to
uncertainty to be sensitive also to nancial crises (Crisisc;t).
3.6.2 Propagation mechanisms of uncertainty
 If real options theory is an important propagation mechanism of uncertainty, this might
be observed most sharply in industries where capital depreciation is rapid (DEPi) or
where input adjustment costs are high, since this increases the cost of waiting for un-
certainty to be resolved (LMPi, SPECi). This might also be expected to particularly
impact high-human capital industries (HCi), because unskilled labor is easier to ad-
just than skilled labor, which may entail more rm- or task-specic knowledge than
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unskilled labor. We would also expect to see declining labor productivity in these
industries as rms would be acting before uncertainty is fully resolved, leading to a
higher likelihood of unproductive investments.15
 If risk aversion is an important propagation mechanism of uncertainty, since this works
through nancial channels such as increases in the cost of external nance, we would
expect to see a disproportionate negative impact of uncertainty on industries with high
external nance dependence (EFDi) or R&D intensity (RNDi). Again, we might also
expect whatever industries are most sensitive to uncertainty to be sensitive also to
nancial crises (Crisisc;t).
 If growth options theory is an important propagation mechanism of uncertainty, we
would expect industries that are linked to the process of economic growth (LABi,
ISTCi and/or RNDi) to display a positive interaction with uncertainty. In addition,
we might expect high growth in the more exible industries, or low growth in the more
inexible industries (e.g. high LMPi, SPECi or HCi), depending on which type of
inexibility is more important for capital, intermediates, or labor. Since this theory
relies on the ability to rapidly revert to an old project if new projects do not work,
however, we might expect a negative coe¢ cient on DEPi, since this would imply that
the capital used in the old project would depreciate rapidly while the new project is
explored unless it is possible to costlessly move resource between projects or maintain
the old project costlessly. In addition, since this theory implies that rms act as though
they were risk-loving, we might expect to see this mostly in the stock-market based
measures of uncertainty.
 If Oi-Hartman-Abel e¤ects constitute an important propagation mechanism of un-
certainty, we would again expect high growth in the more exible industries, or low
growth in the more inexible industries (e.g. high LMPi, SPECi or HCi). Since
according to this theory these industries display low growth because they cannot ex-
pand to take advantage of any positive productivity shocks that might appear, they
should display disproportionately slow labor productivity growth and also slow growth
in capital expenditures and employment. However, because according to this theory
the key mechanism for uncertainty to a¤ect industry growth is the ability to contract
rapidly and costlessly in the event of negative shocks, this would suggest that DEPi
15This may not apply to high-HCi industries: if unskilled labor is easy to re (or adjust), then labor
productivity may increase when the more productive skilled labor is kept.
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should carry a positive coe¢ cient, since rapid depreciation allows rms to contract
without incurring xed investment costs or the costs of irreversibilities. Again, since
this theory implies that rms act as though they were risk-loving, we might expect to
see this mostly in the stock-market based measures of uncertainty.
4 Findings
4.1 Empirical results
We rst estimate the basic regression equation (1) using the three measures of industry
growth as the dependent variable and inserting the interaction terms of uncertainty with the
technological variables one by one. We begin by spelling out the results and turn to a full
analysis thereof later.
First, there are various technological interactions with statistical signicance: see Table
4. However, almost all of them occur for one measure of uncertainty: bond volatility. A few
occur for exchange rate volatility, but none for the other measures of uncertainty. Thus, the
key measure of uncertainty leading to dispersion in industry growth appears to be systemic
volatility.
Second, there are several statistically signicant interactions of technology with systemic
uncertainty, the only technological variables that interact robustly with uncertainty in the
sense that there is a signicant interaction regardless of the measure of industry growth are
depreciation DEPi and investment lumpiness LMPi. Other technological interactions are
not robust either in that they have inconsistent sign or inconsistent statistical signicance.
As discussed later, this nding is robust to a variety of controls and robustness checks.
We conclude that the key interactions of interest are between uncertainty and these two
technological variables, DEPi and LMPi.
We learn more about the interaction of capital depreciation and lumpiness with uncer-
tainty by examining dependent variables other than industry growth. These include the
growth of capital formation, employment, the number of establishments, labor productivity
and prices. See Table 5.
We nd that high-depreciation and high-lumpiness industries experience slower labor
productivity growth in uncertain times. This is consistent with the hypothesis that xed
costs of investment lead these rms not to replace depreciating capital while they wait for
uncertainty to be resolved. It is also consistent with the notion that rms are losing labor
productivity because, pending the resolution of uncertainty, they are deferring investments in
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growth opportunities. Thus, either rms in these industries are forced to act hastily because
of the cost of waiting (as in the contractionary theories of uncertainty) or they are unable to
take advantage of positive opportunities that come along (as in the expansionary theories).
We also nd that high-lumpiness industries also experience slower employment growth.
Where lumpiness (and xed investment costs) is low, rms can invest and maintain capacity
while waiting for uncertainty to be resolved. On the other hand, where lumpiness (and xed
investment costs) are high, it may be very costly to maintain capacity while waiting so that
rmscapital stock shrinks and, optimally, so does the labor force.
Interestingly, both types of industries experience higher growth rates in the number of
establishments, compared to other industries. This implies either disproportionately high
entry or disproportionately low exit in these industries in times of uncertainty. It is not
obvious what implications this nding has for most of the theories of uncertainty without
developing models of how each of them is linked to the process of entry and exit. However,
there is one exception. Risk aversion theory hinges on uncertainty raising the costs of external
funds, which would likely suppress activity by both entrants and incumbents, suppressing
entry and increasing exit and leading to a decrease in the number of establishments in the
most a¤ected industry. This is inconsistent with our ndings.
Finally, we do not notice any di¤erential interaction with price growth, nor capital growth
(specically, growth in gross xed capital formation). The former suggests that price un-
certainty is not important for our ndings. The latter suggests that, even though the costs
of capital adjustment or of maintaining the capital stock di¤er across industries, and even
though these variables DEPi and LMPi interact with uncertainty, interestingly gross invest-
ment behavior is not necessarily very di¤erent.
4.2 Analysis
We now relate our ndings explicitly to the matrix of 12 broad theories of uncertainty
mentioned earlier in Section 2.
4.2.1 Sources of shocks
Nominal sources: First of all, we do not nd evidence of any relationship between uncertainty
and nominal sources. The only nominal uncertainty measure exchange rate volatility is
not robustly related to any technological measure. Intermediate intensity INTi does not
robustly interact with uncertainty. Most tellingly, for the industry characteristics that do
interact with uncertainty, there is no disproportionate movement in price indices.
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Table 5: Mechanisms
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t= i;c+i;t+c;t+1(LevelShockc;tX i) + 2(UncertaintyShockc;tX i) + 3Controlsi;c;t+c;i;t
We only report 2. Each cell represents one regression. The dependent variable Growthc;i;tis industry capital formation,
employment, establishment, labor productivity and price growth rate. Independent variables are the following: DEPi (de-
preciation) and LMPi (investment lumpiness) are the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). Bond
uncertainty measure is from Bloom et al (2012). Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
Bond
Uncertainty
Capital formation
growth rate
regression
employment growth
rate regression
establishment
growth regression
Labor productivity
growth rate
regression
Price growth rate
regression
DEP -0.237 -0.00621 0.190** -17.58*** 0.0161
(0.125) (0.00729) (0.0802) (3.428) (0.0306)
LMP -0.155 -0.0556** 0.484*** -44.91*** -0.0659
(0.446) (0.0274) (0.186) (8.915) (0.0563)
Observations 12,532 16,236 9,804 16,006 14,327
Financial sources: We do not nd any relationship between uncertainty and nance.
We do not nd that external nance dependence (EFDi) interacts with uncertainty shocks.
In addition, Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) argue that the deep technological characteristic
underlying external nance dependence is in fact R&D intensity: we do not nd evidence
of an interaction between uncertainty and RNDi either. The absence of evidence linking
uncertainty with nancial dependence is consistent with the ndings of Caldara et al (2016),
who nd that while uncertainty may sometimes have an impact on nancial markets they
are not the main source thereof.
To further explore this question, we do two things. First, we examine whether our
uncertainty measures are correlated with the nancial crisis indicator Crisisc;t . We nd that,
in fact, the correlation between Crisisc;t and uncertainty is quite high. The correlations range
between 9:29 percent for bond market uncertainty and 24:0 percent for stock market volatility
and are very highly statistically signicant (for example, the computation of the correlation
of Crisisc;t with bond market volatility uses 35; 804 observations). The relationship remains
highly statistically signicant even when we condition on country xed e¤ects. This suggests
that there could be a nance-uncertainty link. Then, we introduce into our specication an
additional control in the form of an interaction variable of the technological variables with
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Table 6: Control Banking Crisis
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t= i;c+i;t+c;t+1(LevelShockc;tX i) + 2(UncertaintyShockc;tX i) + C(Crisisc;t Xi) + 3Controlsi;c;t+c;i;t
We only report 2and C . Each cell represents one regression. The dependent variable is value added, output index and output
growth rate respectively. Independent variables are the following: DEPi (depreciation) and LMPi (investment lumpiness) are
the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). Bond uncertainty measure is from Bloom et al (2012).
Banking crisis data is from Laeven et al. (2013). Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
Output growth measure INTERACTION DEP LMP
Valua added growth
Crisis×X -0.0829 0.0256
(0.0981) (0.273)
Bond Uncertainty×X -0.295*** -0.702***
(0.0550) (0.208)
Output index growth
Crisis×X 0.00234 0.00147
(0.00381) (0.0105)
Bond Uncertainty×X -0.00668*** -0.0234***
(0.00254) (0.00727)
Output growth
Crisis×X 0.0220 0.285
(0.0717) (0.242)
Bond Uncertainty×X -0.142** -0.303***
(0.0610) (0.0904)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
the nancial crisis indicator Crisisc;t . The specication then becomes:
Growthc;i;t = i;c + i;t + c;t + 1(LevelShockc;t Xi) + 2(UncertaintyShockc;t Xi)
+ C(Crisisc;t Xi) + 3Controlsi;c;t + c;i;t
We nd that, rst of all, the impact on industry growth of the interaction of LMPi and of
DEPi with systemic uncertainty is robust to the inclusion of this control variable, indeed it
remains statistically signicant for all three measures of industry growth. Furthermore, the
interactions of Crisisc;t with LMPi and with DEPi are not signicant. Thus, our approach
to identifying the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty does not uncover any evidence of a
signicant nancial channel underlying our ndings. See Table 6.
Real sources: We also do not nd any consistent link between uncertainty and any of
the technological variables typically associated with real shocks in growth-based business
cycle models à la Kydland and Prescott (1982): LABi, ISTCi and RNDi. Greenwood et
al (1988) argue for a model of the business cycle where shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of
investment (i.e. ISTC) are important, but that the key propagation mechanism is the utiliza-
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tion rate (which increases depreciation). If high-depreciation industries are also industries
where depreciation is most sensitive to utilization (which makes sense if the depreciation
rate of unutilized capital is close to zero) then utilization will be highly sensitive to uncer-
tainty in these industries. Assuming upward growth is bounded by 100 percent utilization,
and that utilization rates in general are fairly high, this would suggest that industries with
high depreciation are more likely to experience disproportionately low growth because they
can contract easily if shocks are bad, but cannot expand much when shocks are good. If
lumpiness is an indicator of xed costs, again utilization rather than changes in investment
becomes a key margin of adjustment to shocks, and therefore to uncertainty. However, in
this case we would expect to see disproportionately low investment in these industries in
uncertain times (since the inability to invest when shocks turn out to be good is the key
mechanism here), which is something we do not see.
We conclude that any consistent source of real shocks is not obviously related to the
growth process. An example would be policy uncertainty, something that is explored in
Baker et al (2016) and Stokey (2016). Alternatively, another possibility is that there is no
consistent source of uncertainty, rather uncertainty may come from any direction.
4.2.2 Propagation mechanisms
First we turn to the contractionary mechanisms, risk aversion and real options. Then we
turn to the expansionary mechanisms, growth options and Oi-Hartman-Abel e¤ects.
Risk aversion: Risk aversion theory leads uncertainty to a¤ect industry dynamics mainly
through nancial channels, particularly through the cost of borrowing. This is consistent
with the fact that bond market uncertainty is the main measure of uncertainty that interacts
with industry growth. However, we would also expect growth in EFDi- or RNDi-intensive
industries to be especially slow during uncertainty shocks, since these industries depend the
most on external nancing. Alternatively, we would expect crises and uncertainty shocks to
display some similarities in terms of their technological interactions. As discussed above, we
do not nd any of these e¤ects. Finally, risk aversion theory works through higher external
nancing costs in uncertain times, which should hurt both entrants and incumbents, reducing
entry and increasing exit. The fact that the industries that grow slowest in uncertain times
see an increase in the number of enterprises is inconsistent with this theory.
Real options: Real options theory, on the other hand, is consistent with the results. DEPi
and LMPi are factors that would make it costly to wait for the resolution of uncertainty,
leading to hasty decisions in the form of either premature investment in new projects or
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premature exit. In the theory of real options, when a rm faces an imperfectly reversible
growth opportunity, an important consequence of any uncertainty regarding the payo¤ from
the opportunity is that waiting for the uncertainty is resolved becomes a valuable option.
Pursuing the growth opportunity is equivalent to exercising the option and giving up the
possibility of waiting for more information a possibility which is more valuable when there
is greater uncertainty, and which would lead to the more e¢ cient adoption (and rejection)
of growth opportunities.
Consider the impact of depreciation on the value of the option to pursue a growth op-
portunity. When capital depreciates rapidly, not exercising the option means a rapid decline
in the capital stock (or a greater cost to replacing depreciated capital), and hence it is more
costly to wait in such industries. When uncertainty is high, industries that can wait cost-
lessly will do so, whereas those where waiting is costly (e.g. depreciation is rapid, or there are
xed costs to replacing depreciated capital) will not be able to wait as long before they incur
the up-front costs of investment, and will do so before uncertainty has been fully resolved,
meaning sometimes they will pursue projects that are not protable, slowing growth.
Now consider the impact of investment lumpiness, generally interpreted to indicate a xed
cost of investment as in Cooper et al (1999). When capital is not costly to adjust, the rm
holding the option may seamlessly top up its current capital to maintain the protability
of the old project while it waits for uncertainty to be resolved. On the other hand, where
xed costs of investment are large, uncertainty becomes costly as the rm does not invest
and its capital declines (unless it pays the xed cost). Again, the rm may not be able to
wait for uncertainty to be resolved, and may adopt projects that are found later not to be
protable, slowing growth. This may also result in rings and hence lower employment
growth because if capital and labor are at all substitutable an industry where xed costs of
investment or investment irreversibilities are high may optimally prefer to shrink in response
to lower productivity by ring rather than disinvesting. This employment e¤ect may not be
visible in high-DEPi industries because disinvestment there is easier.
Growth options: According to this theory, if reversion to an old project is easy, uncertainty
creates larger prot opportunities that are insured by the possibility of reverting to the
prior project in case downside risk materializes. In this case, we would expect industries
where growth opportunities are abundant to interact (positively) with uncertainty. Growth
theory emphasizes neutral technical progress, investment specic technical progress, R&D
and human capital accumulation as key factors of economic growth. However, none of these
turn out to interact robustly with uncertainty.
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In addition, the nding that the number of establishments goes up in the industries with
negative growth interactions goes against this theory. In conjunction with our interaction
ndings, this theory would imply that high-DEPi and high-LMPi industries have a harder
time taking advantage of growth opportunities when there is uncertainty. In this case,
there should be an increase in exit compared to other industries where incumbents can take
advantage of growth opportunities, and thus a decrease in the number of rms unless there
is a disproportionately large number of entrants. This seems unlikely since for entrants
reverting to the "prior project" takes the form of exit. Since many incumbents do survive
this implies that the benet from exiting is not as large as the benet from reverting to
old projects: it is incumbents, not entrants, who are better positioned to take advantage of
growth opportunities.
Finally since this theory hinges on rms becoming risk-loving we would expect interac-
tions with the stock-market based measure of uncertainty, which concerns riskier assets. We
do not nd any such interactions.
Oi-Hartman-Abel e¤ects: These e¤ects emphasize the possibility of rapid expansion and
contraction depending on how uncertainty is resolved, which provides implicit insurance
to rms against negative shocks. This insurance should not be readily available to rms
where contraction is costly. This means rms where xed costs are high or investment
irreversibilities are signicant (e.g. LMPi is high), or where depreciation (DEPi) is low
because high depreciation allows the rm to contract without having to disinvest. This
is consistent with the negative interaction of uncertainty with LMPi, but not with the
negative interaction with DEPi: a positive coe¢ cient would be expected. In addition, one
would expect that gross capital formation would be disproportionately low in high-LMPi
industries, since this is the key mechanism of Oi-Hartman-Abel e¤ects: we observe no such
phenomenon.
Also, since this theory hinges on rms becoming risk-loving we would expect interactions
with the stock-market based measure of uncertainty, which concerns riskier assets. We do
not nd any such interactions.
nally, since this mechanism revolves around the timing - rather than the volume - of
investment, it does not have clear implications for whether or not investment would be
expected to be disproportionately high or low, so it is consistent with the absence of an
interaction of DEPi and LMPi with capital expenditures growth.
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4.3 A simple model
To conclude, we nd that our results are mainly consistent with the real options theory of
uncertainty propagation. We describe below a simple model of how we see real options theory
being consistent with our ndings. The purpose is to clarify in a simple framework some
key assumptions that might be useful in further research for conrming our interpretations
or more generally for sorting among theories. The key assumptions are that uncertainty
provides opportunities for the better, as well as for the worse, and that (as assumed by real
options theory) full costless reversion to a prior project is not possible after investing in a
new project. Then, depreciation and lumpiness are essentially proxies for the holding costs
of the old project.
Consider an environment with three stages t 2 f0; 1; 2g: an initial stage, a stage of
uncertainty and a stage where uncertainty is resolved. We consider these three stages to
take place over the course of a year, the period length in our data. In this environment there
is a rm that discounts the future with factor  2 (0; 1], which has a current project that
yields old in stage 0, a benchmark period. In stage t > 0 it yields old (1  )t. This reects
two possibilities. One is that capital in the project depreciates and is costly to replace.
Another is that capital investment is subject to xed costs, so the project declines in size
because capital depreciates and is replaced rarely and in lumps. Thus, the parameter 
captures aspects of depreciation and also of investment lumpiness.
There is also an uncertain investment option available to the rm, which pays new + ".
The random variable " 2 f ; g, each with probability 0:5. The rm can switch to the new
project, but only by abandoning the old project, in which case its old capital invested in
the old project becomes worthless. For example, retooling a factory to produce a new model
of a product requires the removal of the old conguration and machinery, and may even
require changes to the work force or the management structure if the required knowledge is
di¤erent. Thus there is investment irreversibility. For simplicity, we assume it is complete
i.e. adopting the new growth opportunity entails the complete obsolescence of the old one.
If the rm adopts the project in stage 1, it does so without observing the value of ". If it
adopts the project in stage 2, however, it does so under complete information. Notice that
there are several interpretations of this setup. " could be an idiosyncratic variable that is
temporarily subject to uncertainty. On the other hand, " could also be an aggregate variable
that is revealed when agents start to act on it in stage 1, so agents who wait until stage 2
can free-ride on the information generated in period 1.
Finally, suppose that new > old, and that old > new . In other words, the expected
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protability of the new project exceeds that of the old: however, it is inferior in certain
states of the world. Thus, under complete information, the growth opportunity would only
be adopted when it is superior to the old project, not otherwise.
Now we examine the rms payo¤s. In stage 0 the rm simply earns old. In stage 1,
if they do not switch projects they get old (1  ). If they do switch however they earn
new + ". Since uncertainty is symmetrical, in expectation they get new.
In stage 2 the rm has full information. If they did not adopt the new project in stage
1, they will do so in stage 2 only if it is protable to do so, thus they earn either new +  or
old (1  )2 with probability half. On the other hand, if they did adopt the new project in
stage 1, they would earn in expectation new (1  new), where new is the depreciation rate
associated with the new project.
The rms expected payo¤ is then:
old +max

new + 
2new (1  new) ; old (1  ) + 1
2
2old (1  )2 + 1
2
2 (new + )

The rm updates in stage 1 before uncertainty is resolved i¤
new + new (1  new) > old (1  ) + 1
2
old (1  )2 + 1
2
 (new + ) :
Clearly a higher value of  greater uncertainty does not change the expected value of the
new project at all. At the same time, greater uncertainty raises the value of waiting relative
to the value of not waiting.
Notice also that the left hand side does not depend on , whereas the right hand side
declines with . Thus the rm is more likely to update early when  is higher. This means
that it will sometimes adopt growth opportunities under uncertainty when under complete
information it would have been optimal to let them pass, thus having lower growth on
average.
This simple environment claries some of the assumptions required to explain our ndings
using real options theory. The old project and the new project must have di¤erent features.
This is reected in the idea that the capital cannot be fully transferred between projects,
but also in that the values of  for the two projects are not perfectly correlated. Then, the
reason lumpiness and depreciation slow growth is because these two variables mainly reect
the cost of maintaining current operations, as opposed to the cost of switching to a new
operation.
It is worth noting that one particular option that rms might face in times of greater
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uncertainty the option to cease operations very much looks like this. Whatever the rm
(or owners or managers of the rm) might do if they shut down the rm is likely quite
unconnected with whatever is happening at the rm itself right now. If uncertainty raises
the possibility of exit, and maintaining operations is costly, because DEP or LMP are high,
the rm may shut down even when the uncertainty about whether or not this is optimal has
been resolved, leading to low growth in the industry.
5 Conclusion
We provide an anatomy of how uncertainty a¤ects di¤erent parts of the macroeconomy,
in order to understand the sources and/or impact of uncertainty on the macroeconomy.
Our project allows us to understand the key mechanisms whereby uncertainty a¤ects the
macroeconomy, and thus deepening our understanding of the role of uncertainty in the
macroeconomy and of its role as a cause of the business cycle in particular. We nd that
industries where the holding cost of current investments is high su¤er more in the face
of uncertainty, consistent with them being forced to act before uncertainty is resolved 
either taking on new projects before their worth has been proven, or simply shutting down
operations. In this way, our nding is consistent with the theory of real options. While we
cannot identify a consistent source of macroeconomic uncertainty, we do nd that nancial
considerations are not in general important for our results. This is consistent with Caldara
et al (2016) but in contrast to Arellano et al (2012) and Gilchrist et al (2014).
Our research is the rst to provide a detailed anatomy of the impact of uncertainty at the
industry level, using the technology of production as an organizing principle. Our research
exercise is also comprehensive given the large sample of countries, di¤erent measures of
technology, industry growth and uncertainty. Of course, like all studies, ours has limitations
that should be kept in mind in interpreting results and in thinking of future work. One
caveat is that we limit ourselves to manufacturing sector data, due to the availability of
the data used to construct the technological measures, as well as the availability of industry
growth data in non-manufacturing industries for a large panel of countries. At the same
time, since our measures are related to the technology of production, not the nature of the
output, there is no particular reason why these results should not extend to other sectors.
We underline that we measure "uncertainty" in terms of observed volatility, as in Bloom
(2009) and Baker and Bloom (2013) inter alia. Jurado et al (2015) use a di¤erent approach
to the measurement of uncertainty based on the notion of unforecastability. It would be
36
interesting to extend our study using this alternative approach: however it is challenging
to implement since it would require not only a very large set of economically important
time series for each country but also a set of time series that spans a similar information
set in each case. Nonetheless, since the two interpretations of uncertainty as volatility
vs. unforecastability are not orthogonal, and since we nd that the uncertainty measures
based on the two interpretations/measurement approaches are highly correlated for the US,
our results should apply to both. Although our approach is di¤erent, we share the same
objective as Jurado et al (2015): to develop criteria for narrowing down the empirically
relevant approaches to modeling the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty. We nd that
systemic uncertainty, real options and the costs of delaying investment in new projects are
important elements of any such approach.
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A Econometric procedure
We estimate a case of the following model
Yict = i;c + i;t + c;t +Xict + "ict (3)
where i is industry, c is a country, t is a year. The coe¢ cients i;c; i;t and c;t are
regression coe¢ cients on indicator variables for (i; c), (i; t) and (c; t) pairs respectively. We
have that c 2 f1; Cg, t 2 f1; Tg and i 2 f1; Ng. Also, the panel is unbalanced, so the
number of observations is not C  T N . C is the total number of countries, T year and N
the total number of industries. Xict is a vector of independent variables [Xict1 Xict2:::]
0 :
In order to estimate (3), we transform it so as to eliminate i;c; i;t and c;t: First , we
dene the mean of Yict and Xict by i; c; t. We use the "dot" notation for means for brevity.
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For example, Y ic: is the mean of Yict averaging over di¤erent values of t: Y i:t is the mean of
Yict by c: Y ::: is the mean by i; c and t. Thus,
Y ic: =
1
Tic
TicX
t=1
Yict
Y i:t =
1
Cit
CitX
c=1
Yict
Y :ct =
1
Nct
NctX
i=1
Yict
Y i:: =
1
Cit
1
Tic
CitX
c=1
TicX
t=1
Yict
Y ::t =
1
Nct
1
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NctX
i=1
CitX
c=1
Yict
Y :c: =
1
Tic
1
Nct
TicX
t=1
NctX
i=1
Yict
Y ::: =
1
Tic
1
Nct
1
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CitX
c=1
TicX
t=1
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Similarly ,
X ic: =
1
Tic
TicX
t=1
Xict
X i:t =
1
Cit
CitX
c=1
Xict
X :ct =
1
Nct
NctX
i=1
Xict
X i:: =
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1
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c=1
TicX
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Similar notation applies to i;c; i;t and c;t.
First, we subtract the average over t, so that (3) becomes (notice the terms ic are gone):
Yict   Y ic: =
 
Xict  X ic:
0
 +
 
it   i:

+
 
ct   c:

+ ("ict   "ic:) (4)
Then de-mean (4) over c, yielding
Y i:t   Y i:: =
 
X i:t  X i::
0
 +
 
it   i:

+
 
:t   ::

+ ("i:t   "i::) (5)
Then subtract (5) from (4) (notice it is gone) :
Yict Y ic: Y i:t+Y i:: =
 
Xict  X ic:  X i:t +X i::
0
+
 
ct   c:   :t + ::

+("ict   "ic:   "i:t + "i::)
(6)
Now we de-mean (6) over i :
Y :ct Y :c: Y ::t+Y ::: =
 
X :ct  X :c:  X ::t +X :::
0
+
 
ct   c:   :t + ::

+(":ct   ":c:   "::t + ":::)
(7)
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Then subtract (7) from (6)(notice ct is gone):
Yict   Y ic:   Y i:t + Y i::   Y :ct + Y :c: + Y ::t   Y ::: (8)
=
 
Xict  X ic:  X i:t +X i::  X :ct +X :c: +X ::t  X :::
0

+ ("ict   "ic:   "i:t + "i::   ":ct + ":c: + "::t   ":::)
Thus, we can rewrite (8) in the following form, and estimate the following equation:
eYict = fX 0ict + e"ict (9)
where eYict = Yict   Y ic:   Y i:t + Y i::   Y :ct + Y :c: + Y ::t   Y :::eXict = Xict  X ic:  X i:t +X i::  X :ct +X :c: +X ::t  X :::e"ict = "ict   "ic:   "i:t + "i::   ":ct + ":c: + "::t   ":::
We can estimate  using:
b = fX 0ict eXict 1 eXicteYict
and the standard errors using:
# 1fX 0ict eXict 1 1p
#
fX 0icte"ict
=

# 1fX 0ict eXict 1 1p
#
CitX
c=1
TicX
t=1
NctX
i=1
eXicte"ict
where # is the total number of observations.
In our paper, we estimate the transformed form (9) instead of (3) in the two-stage least
square regressions: In the rst stage ,Xict is a vector of [IVc;t Xi Controlsi;c;t]0 . IVc;t
include natural disaster shocks, political shocks, revolution shocks and terrorist shocks. Yict
is the uncertainty measure that we instrumented for.
Then in the second stage, we use the estimated eYict from (9) and control variables as a
new bXict vector of heYict Controlsi;c;ti0 and Yict is the industry growth variable. That is, we
estimate the following:
Yict = i;c + i;t + c;t + bXict + "ict
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using the demean method again. So that, we can rewrite the estimation equation as
eeY ict = fX 0ict + e"ict (10)
where eeY ict = Yict   Y ic:   Y i:t + Y i::   Y :ct + Y :c: + Y ::t   Y :::eeX ict = bXict   bX ic:   bX i:t + bX i::   bX :ct + bX :c: + bX ::t   bX :::e"ict = "ict   "ic:   "i:t + "i::   ":ct + ":c: + "::t   ":::
We can thus estimate  using:
b = fX 0ict eeX 1 eeX icteeY ict
In general since we do not know the distribution of "ict we do not know the distribution ofe"ict either. We test various distributions for e"ict ; including bootstrap, clustering and allowing
for serially correlated errors. We nd that our results are robust to various distributions ofe"ict. In the paper, we report results using bootstrapped errors.
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